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Exploring Unexplored Frontiers: The Private Right of
Action Under the Louisiana Securities Law
Stephen Miles
INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, an increase in subprime mortgage defaults
caused some softness in the financial markets. Later in 2007, that
softness spread and intensified, causing a liquidity and credit crisis
affecting even prime mortgages. Still later, in 2008, the crisis
expanded further, resulting in the collapse of one of the most
venerated investment banks on Wall Street—Lehman Brothers.
The crisis continued with an economic recession that some say was
the worst since the Great Depression in the 1930s.1
During this period of economic turmoil, stock market indices,
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500, tumbled.
The multi-trillion dollar market for fixed-income investments, such as
asset-backed securities, lost even more value. Not surprisingly,
investments of both institutional investors and individuals saving for
retirement declined in value. In the wake of these losses, investors
sued either their financial advisors or others involved in the sale of the
securities that turned out to be poor investments.
Louisiana was not immune to the poor conditions in the
financial markets, and many Louisiana investors whose investments
lost value, like those in other states, brought lawsuits seeking to
recoup their losses. Such investors often invoked the Louisiana
Securities Law, which was originally enacted in 19202 and was
later re-enacted in 1985.3 These investors, or their attorneys, likely
Copyright 2015, by STEPHEN MILES.
 Mr. Miles has devoted much of his practice to representing individuals
and corporations in claims arising under the Louisiana Securities Law and federal
securities laws. The views and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily the
views and opinions of any other person or entity and should not be viewed as
such.
1. See Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Sheirholz, The Worst Downturn Since the
Great Depression, ECON. POLICY INST. (June 2, 2009), http://www.epi.org/publi
cation/jobspict_200906_preview/, archived at http://perma.cc/GYD6-GTN3.
2. State v. Powdrill, 684 So. 2d 350, 353 (La. 1996) (“Louisiana enacted
its first blue sky law in 1920.”). State securities laws, including Louisiana’s, are
often referred to as “blue sky laws.” See id. The Louisiana Supreme Court offers
that this moniker is derived from a United States Supreme Court decision
describing the purpose of state securities laws “as the prevention of ‘speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.’” Id. (citing
Steven M. Axler, Comment, The Blue Sky Laws of Louisiana, 41 LOY. L. REV. 1
(1995) (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917))).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:701–724 (2003).
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found that, despite being on the books for years, the Louisiana
Securities Law had infrequently been interpreted by Louisiana
courts, leaving investors with little guidance on certain important
issues.
This Article explores the private right of action under the
Louisiana Securities Law, noting interpretations of that law
provided recently by courts in the wake of the financial crisis and
recession.4 It also examines those provisions of the law that have not
often been interpreted by the courts, offering comparisons of the
language of Louisiana’s private right of action to that of its federal
analogue, section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which may be
utilized to fill the gap left by the dearth of Louisiana Securities Law
cases that exists even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis.
I. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
An understanding of the private right of action under the
Louisiana Securities Law requires a review of the federal securities
private right of action on which the Louisiana Securities Law is
based.5 There are at least two provisions of federal securities laws
that have relevance here: section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder.
A. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress
undertook to regulate transactions in securities.6 As part of this
effort, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933. Section 12(2)
of that Act provides a private remedy for purchasers of securities
in an initial distribution of securities where the sale is made by

4. To the author’s knowledge, no such examination of the provisions of the
Louisiana Securities Law has appeared in any publication since 1995 when a
helpful piece was published in the Loyola Law Review. See Axler, supra note 2,
at 1. This Article provides an update in light of the recent financial crisis, with a
focus on the private right of action available under the Louisiana Securities Law.
5. See Powdrill, 684 So. 2d at 353 (Louisiana courts “look to the federal
law and jurisprudence interpreting the securities law for guidance in interpreting
the Louisiana provisions.”); see also Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 282 (5th Cir.
2014) (“Because there is a dearth of law interpreting the definition of a seller
under the state statute, we look to federal law interpreting the Louisiana law’s
model.”).
6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976).
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means of “an untrue statement of a material fact” or an omission.7
The cause of action may be brought against “[a]ny person who”:
Offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission.8
The cause of action is a narrow one. It is only available to
securities purchasers—not securities sellers—and may only be
brought against so-called statutory sellers.9 Although the law applies
to oral communications as well as prospectuses,10 it is directed
primarily at the initial distribution of securities, rather than at
secondary market transactions.11 Purchasers also need not prove
scienter12 or reliance,13 but instead must merely prove that they did
not know of the untruth or omission.14 Purchasers, however, must
prove that the untruth concerned a material fact or that an omitted
fact was material.15
The text of section 12(2) offers a statutory seller two defenses
in addition to the common law defenses that have been recognized
by various courts.16 The seller can offer evidence “that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
7. See Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2)
(2012).
8. Id.
9. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641–42, 647–54 (1988). See also Cortec
Indus. v. Sum Holding, 949 F.2d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that section 12
liability extends to sellers, but not purchasers).
10. § 12(2).
11. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995).
12. Scienter generally means acting “with intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
13. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 576 (stating that section 12(2) provides
“buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance”); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2
F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that scienter and reliance are not
elements of a section 12(2) claim).
14. § 12(2).
15. See, e.g., Simpson v. Se. Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1983)
(describing materiality standard for Section 12(2) claims); TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444–47 (1976) (discussing materiality standard
for claim brought pursuant to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
16. See infra note 131.
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known, of such untruth or omission.”17 The seller can also reduce
the damage recoverable by showing that the damages sought were
not caused by the untruth or omission.18
The damages recoverable by a purchaser under section 12(2) are
significant. A purchaser may obtain from a statutory seller found
liable rescission or damages calculated based upon the consideration
paid if the purchaser no longer owns the security.19
B. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b–5
The second relevant federal remedy was not expressly created
by Congress but rather is an implied remedy long ago recognized
by the United States Supreme Court. For many years, the Court has
recognized that securities market participants have a private right
of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193420 and Rule 10b–521 promulgated thereunder.22 Rule 10b–5
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
17. § 12(2); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Section
12(2) provides the seller a defense if he sustains ‘the burden [of] proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
(the) untruth or omission . . . .’” (quoting section 12(2)).
18. § 12(2).
19. Id. An aggrieved purchaser may sue “to recover the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security.” Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
21. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–
5 (2014).
22. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971) (confirming the existence of private cause of action under Rule 10b–
5); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private
right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b–5 has been
consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied
remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”).
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.23
The implied right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5
has six elements: (1) material misrepresentation (or omission); (2)
scienter; (3) a connection with a purchase or sale of a security; (4)
reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.24 Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b–5 provide a private cause of action in a wider variety
of circumstances than does a claim under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933. For example, the Supreme Court has
interpreted Rule 10b–5 to provide a private right of action for
purchasers and sellers of securities, unlike section 12(2) claims,
which may be brought only by purchasers.25 Rule 10b–5 also is not
limited to securities bought or sold in an initial distribution.26
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 claims, however, require the
plaintiff to bear a heavier burden of proof than the plaintiff
bringing a section 12(2) claim.27 To prove a Rule 10b–5 claim, a
plaintiff is required to show both reliance and loss causation,28
although there is a presumption of reliance in failure-to-disclose
cases.29 As well, a section 10(b)/Rule 10b–5 plaintiff must prove
that “the defendant acted with scienter,”30 rather than merely
proving negligence.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
24. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
25. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31
(1975) (affirming rule that private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 is
available only to purchasers and sellers of securities).
26. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382 (noting the cause of action “can be brought
by a purchaser or seller of ‘any security’ against ‘any person’ who has used ‘any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security”).
27. Id.
28. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008) (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.”); Dura Pharmaceuticals,
544 U.S. at 338 (“A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that
the defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss.”).
29. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–
54 (1972) (“Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.”).
30. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that a private cause of action for damages under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 will not lie “in the absence of any allegation of
‘scienter’—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud”).
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II. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE LOUISIANA
SECURITIES LAW—LOUISIANA’S ANALOGUE TO SECTION 12(2)
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
The Louisiana Securities Law provides a private right of action
roughly analogous to a federal section 12(2) claim. Two provisions
of the Louisiana Securities Law create the private right of action.
First, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:712(A)(2), which has
language analogous to section 12(2), prohibits certain practices in
connection with the sale of securities. Separately, Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 51:714(A) creates a private right of action
against those who violate section 712(A)(2).31 While a section
712(A)(2) claim is different from a federal section 12(2) claim in
several important ways,32 Louisiana courts are nearly uniform in
recognizing that section 712(A)(2) is the analogue to section 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933.33
The Louisiana Securities Law also includes language similar to
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b–5, which can be found in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
51:712(D). Like its federal counterpart, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 51:712(D) prohibits “any person in connection with the
offer, sale, or purchase of any security,” from “employ[ing] any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”34 However, the section
31. Section 714(A) also creates a private right of action for violations of
section 712(A)(1) and section 712(A)(3), which contain registration requirements
for securities and those who sell them. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(A) (2003).
32. See infra Part III.
33. See Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 279 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Section 712 of
the Louisiana Securities Law . . . is not based on Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, but is ‘[m]odeled after Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933.’” (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Powdrill, 684 So.
2d 350, 354 (La. 1996))); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 286 (5th
Cir. 1992) (“The Louisiana Blue Sky Laws . . . were patterned after the 1933
Act.”); Bamburg v. Axis Onshore LP, No. 08-1466, 2009 WL 1579512, at *8–9
(W.D. La. June 4, 2009) (describing claim under Section 712(A) as “Louisiana’s
§ 12(2) equivalent”); State v. Powdrill, 684 So. 2d 350, 353 (La. 1996) (“The
provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law, (formerly known as Louisiana Blue
Sky Law) are analogous to the provisions of the federal Securities Act of
1933.”); Ponthier v. Manalla, 951 So. 2d 1242, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“The
provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law are analogous to the provisions of the
Federal Securities Act of 1933 . . . .”); Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So.
2d 1383, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he parties agree that parts of the
Louisiana Blue Sky Law are analogous to provisions of the federal Securities
Act of 1933 and that LSA-R.S. 51:712(A)(2) is analogous to Section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act.”). But see Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1379 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that the language of the predecessor to Section 712(A) “closely
tracks that of rule 10b–5”).
34. Section 712(D), in its entirety, provides:
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conferring the private right of action, section 714(A), does not
include any language granting a private right of action against
those who violate the Louisiana analogue to federal Rule 10b–5.35
Relying on the language of section 714(A), Louisiana federal
courts and one state court have rejected attempts by investors to
assert a private right of action under section 712(D), the state
version of Rule 10b–5, in cases decided both before and after the
most recent financial crisis began.36 The conclusions reached by
these courts are largely supported by the interplay between the
federal and state schemes. As previously noted, the Louisiana
Securities Law and, in particular, sections 712 and 714 were reenacted in 1985.37 By that time, the United States Supreme Court
had, on multiple occasions, recognized an implied private right of
action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.38 Securities
plaintiffs have argued that the Louisiana Legislature believed that
by enacting language similar to section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, it
was confirming the existence of a private right of action under
Louisiana law. But, more likely, the Legislature’s choice when reenacting the Louisiana Securities Law not to include any language
expressly creating a private right of action for violations of section
712(D) suggests an intent not to create such a right. In contrast,
other states, such as Alabama and Tennessee, have explicitly
included a cause of action for violations of the state counterpart to

It shall be unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(2) To engage in any transaction, act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser
or seller.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(D) (2003).
35. See id. § 51:714(A) (providing right to recover damages against “[a]ny
person who violates R.S. 51:712(A)”).
36. See Blanchard v. Lee, No. 13-220, 2013 WL 5701667, at *3 (E.D. La.
Oct. 18, 2013) (“Louisiana law does not support the § 51:712(D) claim relied on
by plaintiffs in their opposition.”); Tranchina v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse,
Friedrichs, Inc., No. 95-2886, 1996 WL 312026, at *5 (E.D. La. June 7, 1996)
(noting the investor had no right of action for violation of Section 712(D), the
analogue to federal Rule 10b–5); see also Hiern v. Sarpy, No. 94-835, 1995 WL
640528, at *16 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 1995) (same); Dendinger v. First Nat’l Corp.,
Nos. 87–4611, 88–0165 & 89–0824, 1992 WL 318593, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 28,
1992) (same); Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal, L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1281–
82 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
37. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
51:712, 51:714 (2003).
38. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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Rule 10b–5.39 It is thus reasonable to conclude that the Louisiana
Legislature, which is deemed to know relevant Rule 10b–5
jurisprudence,40 deliberately chose not to provide a private right of
action to remedy violations of section 712(D).
III. STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF A PRIVATE CLAIM
UNDER SECTION 712(A)(2)
With no private right of action available to remedy violations
of section 712(D), the primary state law remedy for Louisiana
investors is found in section 712(A)(2). Section 712(A)(2) of the
Louisiana Securities Law reads as follows:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person:
***
(2) To offer to sell or to sell a security by means of any oral
or written untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission, if such person in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the
untruth or omission.41
Unpacking this language, it appears that the text of the
Louisiana Securities Law sets forth four principal elements: (1) an
offer or sale of a security; (2) such offer or sale is by means of any
oral or written untrue statement of fact or any omission of fact; (3)
the statement or omission relates to a material fact; and (4) the
buyer does not know of the untruth or omission. A fifth element
exists, but has been interpreted in such different ways as to make
39. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-122(a)(1) (West 2015) (setting forth
liability for those who “sell a security” in violation of Section 48-2-121(a),
which itself includes language analogous to both Section 12(2) and Rule 10b–5);
see also ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(a) (2002) (setting forth liability for those who sell
securities in violation of any provision of the Act, which includes both an
analogue to Section 12(2) and Rule 10b–5).
40. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 48 (La. 2007) (“A long line of
jurisprudence holds that those who enact statutory provisions are presumed to
act deliberately and with full knowledge of existing laws on the same subject,
with awareness of court cases and well-established principles of statutory
construction, with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view,
and that when the Legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to
have intended a change in the law.”).
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
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describing it succinctly in a list of elements next to impossible. The
statute requires that “such person in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known of the untruth or omission,” but the cases
diverge widely on who—plaintiff–purchaser or defendant–seller—
bears the burden of proof on this point as well as on what must be
proven, with most cases holding that the defendant’s reasonable
care is at issue, while at least one case holds that this “element”
concerns the diligence of the plaintiff.42 Finally, more than one
case provides that loss causation is an element of a Louisiana
Securities Law claim.43
Judicial interpretations of the elements of a section 712(A)(2)
claim are discussed below, with particular emphasis on those
provisions that have recently been interpreted by Louisiana courts
as well as on those provisions that remain unexamined. In both
instances, the discussion compares section 712(A)(2) and section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. A wealth of caselaw
interpreting section 12(2) has developed over the years and
provides much-needed guidance in interpreting section 712(A)(2).
A. The “Seller” Requirement Under Louisiana Law
An analysis of the text of section 712(A)(2) confirms that the
Louisiana Securities Law includes a requirement that the defendant be
a “seller” of securities. For comparison purposes, section 12(2) of the
federal Securities Act of 1933 applies to “any person who . . . offers
or sells a security.”44 Because this language specifically refers to the
actions of “offer[ing]” and “sell[ing],” courts interpreting section
12(2) have concluded that a section 12(2) claim may only be
brought against a seller of securities, not a purchaser.45
The equivalent portion of section 712(A)(2) includes nearly
identical language, rendering it unlawful “[t]o offer to sell or to sell
a security” if the other elements of the cause of action are met.46
Section 712(A)(2) also references the “buyer” needing to prove
42. See infra Part III.F and cases cited therein.
43. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”), aff’d on other grounds by
Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). See also
Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(explaining that a claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the
causation standard articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal
securities law”).
44. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
45. See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 50 (2d
Cir. 1991) (stating that section 12 liability extends to seller, not purchasers).
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
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that he did not know “of the untruth or omission.”47 Although
caselaw interpreting this language in section 712(A)(2) is sparse
even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the language of the
statute suggests that a state law claim for violating section
712(A)(2) may only be brought by a buyer against a seller of a
security, not by a seller against a buyer.
A question exists regarding who is a “seller”—the person or
entity who solicited the sale or transferred title, or others more
tangentially involved in the sale, such as lawyers and accountants.
The United States Supreme Court answered this question in 1988
in Pinter v. Dahl with respect to section 12(2)’s “seller”
requirement, which is analogous to section 712(A). In Pinter, as
recognized by one federal court in Louisiana,
The Supreme Court held that generally, liability should not
extend beyond those who offer securities for [sale] or solicit
offers for sale but that inclusion of the phrase “solicitation of
an offer to buy” within the [federal] definition of “offer”
brings a non-owner who engages in solicitation within the
scope of the [Securities Act of 1933].48
Pinter overruled a line of federal precedent that had interpreted
“seller” in section 12(2) broadly to cover all persons who were a
“substantial factor” in bringing about the transaction, including
lawyers and accountants.49
Despite Pinter’s narrowing of the persons who are statutory
“sellers” under section 12(2), and the similarity in language
47. Id.
48. Keller v. Bryan-Worley & Co., Nos. 88-1620, 88-1722, 1989 WL 1771,
at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 1989) (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641–42, 647–
54 (1988)). See also Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1384–86
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that investor stated a claim pursuant to section
712(A) where broker allegedly “used ‘high pressure’ sales techniques and
fraudulent misrepresentations to induce him to make a number of purchases of
extremely speculative stock”).
49. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980) (Section 12(2)
liability reaches to those “whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a
substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.”), overruled by Pinter,
486 U.S. at 648–55. Of note, the Supreme Court in Pinter interpreted section
12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which is identical to section 12(2). See
Pinter, 486 U.S. at 648–55. Federal appellate courts have since followed Pinter
in confirming that the substantial factor test does not apply to section 12(2)
claims. See, e.g., Ryder Int’l Corp. v. First Am. Nat’l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521,
1527 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Much of the same reasoning the Supreme Court used to
reject the substantial-factor test as employed by the Fifth Circuit to determine
section 12(1)’s scope, also applies to whether that test has continued validity
under section 12(2) . . . .” (citations omitted)); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473,
478–79 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that Pinter applies to section 12(2)).
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between section 12(2) and section 712(A)(2), the timing of the
enactment of section 712(A)(2) allows an argument for a broader
interpretation of “seller”—one that potentially includes lawyers,
accountants, or others involved in the sale of securities. As noted
above, the Louisiana Securities Law was re-enacted in 1985. At
that time, the language of section 12(2) was interpreted broadly
under the line of precedent later overruled by Pinter. Anyone
determined to be a “substantial factor” in bringing about the sale
was considered to have “[o]ffer[ed] or s[old] a security” for
purposes of section 12(2) liability.50 Against this legal backdrop,
which the Louisiana Legislature is deemed to know, the
Legislature re-enacted the Louisiana Securities Law using the
language of federal section 12(2) that was then being interpreted
broadly.51 It is therefore at least plausible that the Louisiana
Securities Law should be interpreted to allow a cause of action
against anyone who is a “substantial factor” in bringing about the
sale.52 However, because the Supreme Court in Pinter rejected the
“substantial factor” test based upon its careful reading of the
language employed in section 12(2), and because the language of
the Louisiana Securities Law is identical in relevant respects to that
of section 12(2), the substantial factor test likely does not have
much of a foothold in Louisiana law.
B. By Means of “Any Oral or Written Untrue Statement of
Material Fact or Omission”
The second statutory element of a section 712(A)(2) claim has
been interpreted very infrequently. A comparison of the wording of
section 712(A)(2) to that of section 12(2), however, provides some
insight into the meaning of the requirement that the security be
sold by means of “any oral or written untrue statement of material
fact or omission.”53
The federal section 12(2) claim has a limited application. The
United States Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. held
that a section 12(2) claim applies only to the sale of securities
made during the initial distribution of securities, i.e., initial public
50. See Pharo, 621 F.2d at 667.
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003) (imposing liability on those
who “offer[ed] to sell or [sold] a security”).
52. See Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal, L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1280–81
(2009) (considering whether an accountant was a substantial factor in bringing
about a sale in determining potential liability under section 712(A)(2), but
stopping short of adopting substantial factor test).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
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offerings.54 The Court in large part limited the applicability of
section 12(2) because of that statute’s use of the phrase
“prospectus.” The Court reasoned that because section 12(2)
applied to “[a]ny person who . . . [o]ffers or sells a security . . . by
means of a prospectus or oral communication,” and because the
term “prospectus” referred to “public offers by an issuer or its
controlling shareholders,” section 12(2) was limited to initial
public offerings.55
Section 712(A)(2), in contrast to section 12(2), does not include
the phrase “prospectus,” the key word central to the Gustafson
decision. Instead of the phrase “a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact” found in
section 12(2), section 712(A)(2) employs the phrase “any oral or
written untrue statement of a material fact.”56 Section 712(A)(2)
thus appears to apply to a broader group of transactions than does
section 12(2). In this regard, the language of section 712(A)(2)
approximates that of federal Rule 10b–5, which prohibits the
making of “any untrue statement of material fact”57 and has been
interpreted to apply beyond the initial distribution of securities.58
Although no Louisiana case has considered whether there are
Gustafson-type limitations on section 712(A)(2), the plain text of
section 712(A)(2) suggests there are not.
Similar to a section 12(2) claim, the second element of a section
712(A)(2) claim also includes a requirement that the investor prove
that the statement made was “untrue” or that a statement is
“misleading” because of an omitted material fact.59 Although
countless federal cases discuss in detail whether particular alleged
statements are untrue as made or misleading without the disclosure
of additional material facts, there is by comparison a dearth of
caselaw discussing in detail what the terms “untrue” or “misleading”
mean in the Louisiana Securities Law. Many older Louisiana cases
do not mention at all whether the particular statements made were
untrue or misleading.60 Or, alternatively, the cases address the issue
54. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575–78 (1995).
55. Id. at 567–78.
56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A) (2003).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
58. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir.
1997) (“The private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 reaches
beyond statements and omissions made in a registration statement or prospectus
or in connection with an initial distribution of securities and creates liability for
false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact that affect trading on
the secondary market.” (footnote omitted)).
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
60. See, e.g., Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (La.
Ct. App. 1988) (mentioning that plaintiff alleged that the defendant made
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only in passing and with much less explanation of why the statement
is untrue or misleading than can be found in cases discussing the
similar requirement under section 12(2).61 Nonetheless, because
section 712(A)(2) is patterned after section 12(2), litigants can refer
to the vast body of federal caselaw discussing when a statement is
“untrue” or “misleading” for guidance.
One recent Louisiana case provides some guidance, at least for
cases involving omissions. In Macareno v. Karon, Judge Hicks of
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana considered a claim brought pursuant to the Louisiana
Securities Law by investors in a mineral lease against the person
who sold them their interest.62 The transaction was consummated
when the investors wired their purchase money to the seller, who
then was to operate the lease.63 Before analyzing the statements at
issue, the court acknowledged that “affirmative statements or
misrepresentations” are a prerequisite for a Louisiana Securities
Law claim.64 It then reasoned that the seller’s “instruction to wire
the purchase money to [the seller] directly” was misleading
without an explanation that the money wired would not be used as
intended.65 The court also noted that the seller immediately after
the purchase sent to the investors an operating agreement, which
provided that the seller, through a wholly owned limited liability
company, would operate the leases, and the court concluded that
this was misleading without an accompanying disclosure that the
seller had “limited experience operating mineral leases.”66 Based
on this reasoning, the court concluded that the investor’s claim
should survive summary judgment, and the omissions issue should
be presented to the jury.67
The Macareno case is one of the only Louisiana cases that
helpfully explains that affirmative statements or misrepresentations
are a prerequisite to any omissions claim under section 712(A)(2)

“specific allegations” regarding the misstatements of material fact without
discussing what those misstatements were).
61. See, e.g., Se. Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., 954 So. 2d
120, 123 (La. 2007) (referencing the defendant’s alleged “misrepresentations and
omissions of material fact related to the state of [the defendant corporation’s]
financial condition and the state of its technology”).
62. Macareno v. Karon, No. 08-0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *1 (W.D. La.
Feb. 24, 2010).
63. Id.
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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and provides examples of the types of statements rendered
misleading by an omission. Nonetheless, there remains a dearth of
caselaw on point, and reference to the better-developed federal law
will be of use to investors and sellers alike to determine whether the
particular statements at issue are “untrue” or “misleading” without
additional disclosures.
C. Materiality
The recent Macareno decision also provides helpful insight
into the meaning of the materiality requirement under section
712(A)(2).68 In considering whether certain undisclosed facts were
material, the court there closely followed federal law, stating that,
under the Louisiana Securities Law, “the standard for materiality is
objective, not subjective.”69 Going further, the court articulated a
working definition of materiality exclusively by reference to
federal law, concluding that various facts not disclosed to the
investor were material because such facts “‘would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the total mix
of information made available.’”70 The Macareno court’s
articulation of the meaning of materiality and its reliance on
federal law make sense. Both section 712(A)(2) and section 12(2)
use the term “material” in similar ways.71 Accordingly, there is no
reason to believe that materiality under Louisiana law should mean
anything different than it does under federal law. Although there is
little caselaw interpreting section 712(A)(2), under Macareno, and
considering the similarity between the federal and state law,
litigants and practitioners seeking to interpret “materiality” under
section 712(A)(2) would be justified in referring to the vast body
of federal caselaw that explores the contours of what constitutes
information that “would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having altered the total mix of information made
available.”72
68. Id. at *4, 5.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *5 (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 418–19 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
71. Both statutes prohibit certain “untrue statement[s] of material fact” and
require the disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order to make” certain
statements “not misleading.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003);
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
72. Macareno, 2010 WL 743564, at *5. This vast body of federal caselaw
finds its origins in the Supreme Court case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), which explained that to fulfill the materiality
requirement “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
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D. The Purchaser’s Knowledge of the Untrue Fact or Omission
The section 712(A)(2) requirements of knowledge and reliance
have been infrequently interpreted by Louisiana courts, but the text
of section 712(A)(2) is nearly identical to the text of section 12(2).
Section 712(A)(2) states clearly that the “buyer” must not “know[]
of the untruth or omission,”73 while the section 12(2) purchaser
similarly must show that he did “not know[] of [the] untruth or
omission.”74
There is, however, no requirement that the buyer prove reliance
on the untruth or omission. Recently, Judge Hicks in Macareno so
held,75 as did a panel of the Fifth Circuit,76 thus confirming that,
under section 712(A)(2) of the Louisiana Securities Law, the
investor need not prove that he or she relied on any statements to
recover, just like a section 12(2) claim.77
E. Loss Causation
Section 712(A)(2) does not explicitly state that loss
causation—a causal connection between the misrepresentation and
the loss—is an element of a Louisiana Securities Law fraud
claim.78 However, one older case as well as a post-financial crisis

significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” See also
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (adopting TSC Industries
materiality test for the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context).
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
74. §12(2).
75. Macareno, 2010 WL 743564, at *5 (stating that “it is clear that reliance
is not a part of the requirements for fraud in Louisiana” when discussing the
investors’ Louisiana Securities Law claim). See also Taylor v. First Jersey Sec.,
Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1385–86 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth the elements
of a Louisiana Securities Law cause of action, which do not include reliance as
listed).
76. Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 281 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Section 712 does not
require a plaintiff to prove that he relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation or
omission.”).
77. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995) (noting the
1933 Securities Act section 12(2) grants “buyers a right to rescind without proof
of reliance”); Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 1992)
(“Section 12(2) . . . has no requirement of justifiable reliance on the part of a
purchaser.” (citation omitted)); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir.
1993) (scienter and reliance are not elements of a section 12(2) claim).
78. Loss causation is different from transaction causation. Loss causation is
“a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (citation omitted).
“Transaction causation is akin to reliance, and requires only an allegation that
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case both hold that loss causation is an essential element of a
section 712(A)(2) claim.79
These cases’ interpretations of Louisiana Securities Law are
different than the requirements for a section 12(2) claim. Section
12(2) does not require the plaintiff–purchaser to prove loss
causation but instead provides the defendant–seller an affirmative
defense of loss causation: the defendant–seller may prove that the
losses claimed are not the result of the “depreciation in value of the
subject security resulting from” the untruth or omission.80
Interestingly, the language of section 12(2) was amended in
1995 to specifically include the loss causation affirmative defense.81
Before that amendment, the language of section 12(2) did not even
mention loss causation, and at least some federal courts held that a
section 12(2) claim did not require proof of loss causation.82 The

‘but for the claimed misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not
have entered into the detrimental securities transaction.’” Lentell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005). Reliance is not an element
of a section 712(A)(2) claim. See discussion supra Part III.D.
79. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”), aff’d on other grounds by
Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). See also
Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(explaining that a claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the
causation standard articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal
securities law”).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2012); In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d
267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under sections 11 and 12(a)(2), plaintiffs do not bear
the burden of proving causation. It is the defendants who may assert, as an
affirmative defense, that a lower share value did not result from any nondisclosure
or false statement.” (citing, inter alia, § 77l(b)).
81. See Dec. 22, 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, Title I, § 105, 109 Stat. 757. The
loss causation requirement for a Section 12(2) claim reads:
(b) Loss causation
In an action described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, if the person
who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or all of the
amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2) of this section represents
other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting
from such part of the prospectus or oral communication, with respect to
which the liability of that person is asserted, not being true or omitting
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statement not misleading, then such portion or amount, as the
case may be, shall not be recoverable.
§ 12(2).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1994); see also Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808
(9th Cir. 1989) (For a section 12(2) claim, “[t]he buyer need not show any causal
connection between the misrepresentation and his damage; indeed, he need not
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language of section 712(A)(2) resembles section 12(2) before the
1995 amendment added the loss causation affirmative defense.83
Nevertheless, under at least two decisions, loss causation is an
essential element of a Louisiana Securities Law fraud claim.84
The loss causation requirement recognized by the Williams and
Fishman courts is good policy, deserving of its foothold in Louisiana
caselaw. Requiring investors to prove loss causation ensures that
investors who seek to recover losses resulting from market
conditions rather than the defendant’s misrepresentation or
omission do not obtain a windfall. Allowing investors to recover
such market losses also unfairly penalizes defendant–sellers,
potentially requiring them to compensate investors for market
losses that investors knew were possible when the investment was
made.
F. Scienter and Knowledge of the Untruth or Omission
A section 712(A)(2) claim under Louisiana law does not appear
to require the plaintiff to prove scienter—an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud—with perhaps one notable exception. The
text of sections 712(A) and 714(A) nowhere mentions deception,
manipulation, or fraud.85 And although the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal in Landry v. Thibaut has held that the standard is
negligence, unlike the standard for a federal Rule 10b–5 claim,

even show that he has been damaged.” (quoting L. LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 873 (1988))).
83. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1994), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:712(A) (2003).
84. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at
*11 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Loss causation is . . . an essential element of
Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana’s Blue Sky Law.”). See also Williams v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 556 So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a
claim under the Louisiana Blue Sky Law “is governed by the causation standard
articulated in numerous federal cases interpreting federal securities law”). The
Fifth Circuit recently affirmed Fishman. See Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co.,
574 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit, however, did not reach the
issue whether loss causation is an element of a section 712(A)(2) claim. Instead,
it concluded that the investors failed to preserve their argument on that issue,
while also stating that “[t]he question whether the Louisiana Securities Law
requires proof of loss causation does not have a straightforward answer.” Id. at
454. Even more recently the Fifth Circuit reiterated that whether loss causation
is an element of a section 712 claim “is uncertain.” Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d
265, 280 n.15 (5th Cir. 2014).
85. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:712, 51:714 (2003).
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which requires scienter.86 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, citing Landry, also has stated that “[s]ection 712
does not require a plaintiff to establish scienter, but, like Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, requires only a showing that
the defendant was negligent.”87 These pronouncements are
supported by the text of section 712(A)(2), which specifically
refers to “the exercise of reasonable care” rather than deception,
manipulation, or fraud.88
One exception is for cases where the financial advisor
allegedly churns the investor’s account—that is, makes excessive
purchases and sales in the investor’s account for the purpose of
generating commissions that benefit the advisor. In 1988, the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Taylor v. First Jersey
Securities, Inc. addressed whether the plaintiff investor had stated
a cause of action for, inter alia, churning under the Louisiana
Securities Law, and concluded that section 712(A) was broad
enough to encompass a claim for churning.89 The court’s analysis
began with a review of the text of section 712(A)(2), which does
not mention scienter.90 But the court later referred to the elements
of a churning claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5—which
specifically include scienter—and in the next sentence stated that
the petition in question “makes all the required allegations.”91
Although this language does not appear to explicitly adopt for
Louisiana the elements of a churning claim under federal law, the
court’s reference to scienter suggests that scienter must be proven
to prevail on a churning claim under the Louisiana Securities
Law.92 No Louisiana courts have addressed this issue since the
Taylor decision in 1988.
For a non-churning case, it appears that negligence is the
standard. But open questions remain: What is the burden of proof,
and who bears that burden—the plaintiff–investor or the defendant–
seller?
86. Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
87. Heck, 775 F.3d at 280 (citing Landry, 523 So. 2d at 1380).
88. Of course, the Louisiana Securities Law does reference fraud and deceit
in section 712(D), but as explained supra the Louisiana Legislature did not
provide a private cause of action for violations of section 712(D). See discussion
supra Part II.
89. Taylor v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
90. Id. at 1385–86. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A) (2003).
91. Taylor, 533 So. 2d at 1386 (citing Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637
F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981)).
92. The court’s reference to a federal 10b–5 churning claim, rather than to
section 12(2)—the federal analogue to section 712(A)(2)—and the absence of a
scienter requirement in the text of section 712(A)(2) calls into question whether
Taylor was correct in recognizing a churning claim under Louisiana law.

2015]

EXPLORING UNEXPLORED FRONTIERS

819

Ambiguous wording of section 712(A)(2) following a statutory
amendment has led to conflicting caselaw on these issues. Before a
1999 amendment, the last clause of section 712(A)(2) read: “if
such person shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission.”93 In 1996, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in State v. Powdrill considered this language in the
context of a criminal prosecution for a purported violation of
section 712(A)(2).94 The court interpreted the phrase “such person”
to refer to the seller and agreed with the prosecution’s description
of this last clause as an affirmative defense for which the seller
bears the burden of proof.95 In fact, the court held that section
712(A)(2) was unconstitutional to the extent that, in criminal
prosecutions, it imposed on the defendant–seller a duty to prove
what the court considered to be “an essential element” of a
criminal violation of section 712(A)(2).96
The Powdrill court’s view of section 712(A)(2), if not its ruling
of unconstitutionality, was consistent with federal courts’
interpretations of similar language in section 12(2). Section 12(2)
imposes liability upon a seller “who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission.”97
In an apparent response to the Powdrill decision, the Louisiana
Legislature in 1999 amended section 712(A)(2) and deleted the
phrase beginning with “shall not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know.”98 After the amendment, section 712(A)(2) read as it
does now:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person:
***
(2) To offer to sell or to sell a security by means of any oral
or written untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission, if such person in the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (1998) (subsequently amended).
684 So. 2d 350 (La. 1996).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 356.
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
Act No. 250, 1999 La. Acts 1094–95.
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exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the
untruth or omission.99
One might think that the Powdrill decision, along with the
subsequent legislative amendment, shows that “such person” in
section 712(A)(2) still refers to the defendant–seller, as it did prior
to the amendment. One also might think that the plaintiff now must
prove that “such person”—the defendant–seller—“in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or
omission.”100
Such a reading of section 712(A)(2), however, would lead to
odd results. A securities plaintiff would seem to negate the
defendant’s negligence if he or she succeeded in proving that “in
the exercise of reasonable care [the defendant] could not have
known of the untruth or omission.”101 If the plaintiff were required
to offer such proof, then arguably the plaintiff never could prove
that the defendant breached the standard of care in failing to
disclose what he or she could not have known. Or, as the Fifth
Circuit recently put it, the statute would “penalize[] a seller that did
not know, and, acting with reasonable care, still could not have
known, of the falsity of the statement or the misleading nature of
the omission.”102 Courts in Louisiana have interpreted the language
in an attempt to make sense of the statute.103 No consensus has
been reached, however, and perhaps none will be reached until the
Legislature amends the statute to add clarity or the Louisiana
Supreme Court offers its interpretation.
Three interpretations have developed since the 1999
amendment. Several Louisiana courts, including three after the start
of the most recent financial crisis, have concluded that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that “the defendant knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known, of the untruth
or omission.”104 These courts effectively read the word “not” out of
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:712(A)(2) (2003).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 279 (5th Cir. 2014).
103. See infra notes 104, 105, 107.
104. See Heck, 775 F.3d at 279–80 (concluding that the current language of
section 712(A)(2) was the product of a “scrivener’s error” included when the
statute was amended in 1999 and “that the legislature simply intended to remove
the burden of proof of demonstrating the exercise of reasonable care from the
defendant and require the plaintiff, or state in a criminal proceeding, to prove the
defendant’s knowledge or negligence”); Bamburg v. Axis Onshore LP, No. 081466, 2009 WL 1579512, at *9 (W.D. La. June 4, 2009) (holding the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that “the defendant knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have known, of the untruth or omission”); Ponthier
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the last clause in section 712(A)(2) and require the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant breached the standard of care by not
discovering the untruth or omission. This interpretation is
consistent with Powdrill and with the 1999 amendment in that it
places the burden of proof on this issue on the plaintiff.
Taking a different view, Judge Hicks in Macareno v. Karon
ascribed a meaning to the word “not” in the statute, concluding that
the statute requires proof that “in the exercise of reasonable care
[defendant] could not have known of the untruth or omission.”105
Citing pre-1999 amendment caselaw, Judge Hicks interpreted the
provision as an affirmative defense, specifically stating that it is
the defendant’s burden to offer such proof.106 Although it gives
meaning to the word “not” in the statute, this interpretation appears
to give little consideration to the Powdrill court’s holding that the
attempt by the prior version of the statute to place the burden on
the defendant was unconstitutional in criminal cases or to the
Legislature’s subsequent attempt to cure the constitutional problem
identified in Powdrill.
The third and final view that has developed since the 1999
amendment was in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana in Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co.107
There, Judge Carl Barbier interpreted section 712(A)(2) as placing
the burden of proof on the plaintiff–investor, consistent with
Powdrill and the 1999 amendment.108 Judge Barbier, however,
appears to have required the plaintiff–investor to prove that he or
she—not the defendant–seller—in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known of the untruth or omission.109 In so doing,

v. Manalla, 951 So. 2d 1242, 1255 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (same); George v. White,
101 So. 3d 1036, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting section 712(A)(2) and
concluding that the plaintiff “has offered no evidence that [defendant] knew or
‘in the exercise of reasonable care’ could have known, that the statements made
in the subscription agreement were not true”).
105. See Macareno v. Karon, No. 08–0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *4 (W.D.
La. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[W]hile plaintiff must plead all elements, ‘defendant must
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.’” (quoting
Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988))).
106. See id.
107. Fishman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 10–2, 2011 WL 4853367, at *11
(E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2011).
108. See id.
109. See id. (“Section 712(A)(2) of the Louisiana Blue Sky Law specifically
provides that a buyer may only maintain a claim for securities fraud if ‘in the
exercise of reasonable care [he] could not have known of the untruth or
omission.’”).
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the court necessarily interpreted the phrase “such person” in the last
clause of section 712(A)(2) to mean the investor–plaintiff or
“buyer,” rather than the defendant–seller. Such a reading gives
effect to the word “not” in the last clause of section 712(A)(2). And
it reasonably concludes that the phrase “such person” refers back to
the word “buyer” in the previous clause, which is logical given that
“buyer” is the last “person” to which the statute refers before the
phrase “such person” in the last clause appears. Although Judge
Barbier’s view is the best of the three interpretations emerging since
the 1999 amendment, it nonetheless creates some tension with the
history of section 712(A)(2) and its federal counterpart, both of
which suggest the focus of the last clause is on the defendant’s
knowledge, not that of the plaintiff–investor.
In the end, none of these three interpretations is perfect, and the
poorly worded 1999 amendment is to blame. Unless the Legislature
amends the statute to add clarity or the Louisiana Supreme Court
considers and resolves the issue, these three divergent and imperfect
interpretations of section 712(A)(2) and perhaps others will
proliferate in the jurisprudence, causing uncertainty for securities
litigants and investors.
IV. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS
OF SECTION 712(A)(2)
Louisiana sets forth control person liability for those who
violate the analogue to a federal section 12(2) claim.110 Control
person liability generally is available to an investor against persons
who, although not the seller of the securities, participated in a
transaction and could have exercised control over the transaction
and stopped the sale.
Control person liability, like many other securities law concepts,
can be found in federal law.111 Although there is some split of
110. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a) (2012). The full text of that statute reads:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under
sections 77k or 77l of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist.
Id.
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authority,112 the prevailing view among the federal courts of appeal
is that control person liability attaches where the defendant
participated in the general operations of the violator and possessed
the power to control the specific activity complained of.113
Under the Louisiana Securities Law, control person liability is
similar to control person liability under federal law. Louisiana
control person liability extends to those “who directly or indirectly
control[]” a person liable for violating section 712(A)(2), and to
“every general partner, executive officer, or director of such person
liable . . . , every person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, and every dealer or salesman who participates in
any material way in the sale is liable jointly and severally.”114
Louisiana courts have had few occasions to interpret this statute,
even after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. On the occasions
Louisiana courts have had to interpret this statute, they have
determined that a supervisor of a seller was a control person, as
were corporate directors of a seller, while an auditor of a seller, a
bank that allegedly induced the sale of securities, and corporations
whose employees were on the board of directors of a seller were
not control persons.115 From these cases, it seems some Louisiana
112. See In re Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n Sec., Deriv., & “ERISA” Litig.,
503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 43 (D.D.C. 2007) (describing split of authority).
113. See, e.g., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985); see also
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that the court considers “whether the alleged control-person actually
participated in, that is, exercised control over, the operations of the person in
general and, then, to whether the alleged control-person possessed the power or
ability to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary
violation was predicated, whether or not that power was exercised”). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff to “at least
show that the defendant had an ability to control the specific transaction or
activity upon which the primary violation is based,” but has not determined
whether the plaintiff must also show the defendant actually exercised such
control, or whether the plaintiff must show general involvement in the
operations of the violator. See Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 283 & n.18 (5th
Cir. 2014).
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).
115. See Bornstein v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., No. 89–3052, 1991 WL 195812,
at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 1991) (finding a fact issue existed as to whether
defendants, who were on the board of directors of the seller, owned stock in the
seller, and approved the stock offering at issue, were control persons); Marrero
v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Supp. 568, 579 (E.D. La. 1980) (finding a
bank that allegedly induced a sale by failing to disclose certain facts not a
control person); Se. Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., No. 06–
1920, 2007 WL 1953148, at *2–3 (La. Ct. App. July 6, 2007) (finding a company
whose employee was a director for the seller company not liable as control
person); Solow v. Heard McElroy & Vestal L.L.P., 7 So. 3d 1269, 1281 (La. Ct.
App. 2009) (finding an accountant auditing seller not a control person); Taylor v.
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courts focus on the language of the statute, which imposes liability
on “general partner[s], executive officer[s], or director[s],” as well
as “dealer[s] or salesm[e]n who participate[]” in the sale.116
At least one federal court, the Fifth Circuit in Heck v. Triche,
focused less on the wording of section 714. Instead it observed that
the “Louisiana precedent is thin on when a defendant ‘controls’ a
primary violator” and “look[ed] to federal law for instruction.”117
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s federal control-person test,118 the Heck
court held that an accountant was liable as a control person.119 The
court’s conclusion relied heavily on the clear-error standard of
review and testimony from the primary violator, who testified that
he was dependent on the accountant to help him emerge from debt,
that the accountant “approved the financial concepts detailed in the
prospectus” and helped arrange financing for the primary violator’s
debt, and that the accountant had discussions with investors about
the collateral that was supposed to have secured their investment.120
Heck demonstrates that individuals peripherally involved in the
transaction at issue and that are not general partners, executives,
supervisors, and the like may nonetheless be subject to control
person liability. Whether such liability ultimately attaches will
depend on the specific facts of the case.121
V. DAMAGES AVAILABLE
Similar to the caselaw interpreting the elements of a cause of
action for a violation of section 712(A)(2), the caselaw interpreting
the damages available to a successful plaintiff–investor is also
undeveloped. The statute itself sets forth a remedy in two parts: one
for those investors who still hold the shares purchased, and another
for investors who have already sold their shares. How these
remedies are implemented in particular factual circumstances may
First Jersey Sec., Inc., 533 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a
supervisor of seller liable as control person).
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).
117. Heck, 775 F.3d at 283.
118. See supra note 113.
119. See Heck, 775 F.3d at 284.
120. See id. at 284.
121. The Heck court underscored the fact-specific nature of the control
person inquiry by distinguishing Solow, a case in which the Louisiana Court of
Appeal for the Second Circuit held that an accountant providing audit services
was not liable as a control person. See id. Because in Heck the accountant was
not alleged to have controlled the primary violator “in his capacity as the CPA,”
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s actions in Heck “went far
beyond the auditing services at issue in Solow.” Id. at 285.
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vary, given that securities transactions come in all shapes and sizes,
and investments are made and securities sold in a variety of market
conditions.
The availability of attorneys’ fees also may vary, depending on
whether the investor continues to hold, or has sold, the investment.
An aggrieved investor who has not already sold his or her shares
may obtain rescission plus attorneys’ fees, interest, and court
costs.122 By contrast, where the investor already has sold his or her
shares, the investor is only entitled to “damages,” defined by the
statute as “the difference between the fair value of the consideration
the buyer gave for the security and the fair value of the security at
the time the buyer disposed of it, plus interest thereon from the date
of payment to the date of repayment.”123 There is no mention in the
definition of “damages” of attorneys’ fees or court costs.124 It
therefore seems that attorneys’ fees and court costs are not
recoverable when the investor has already sold her shares. There is
no readily apparent reason why the Louisiana Legislature would
have intended to allow aggrieved investors who have not sold their
investment to recover attorneys’ fees while affording those who
have sold their investment no such right. Nonetheless, the plain
language of the statute favors that interpretation.
VI. PRESCRIPTION AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Some defenses are available for the seller whose purchaser has
stated a prima facie case under the Louisiana Securities Law.
Prescription is chief among these defenses. For all causes of action
available under the Louisiana Securities Law, including a claim
under section 712(A)(2), “[n]o person may sue . . . more than two
years from the date of the contract for sale or sale, if there is no
contract for sale.”125 Because Louisiana applies the doctrine of
contra non valentem, prescription in most cases “does not begin to
run until the plaintiffs have either actual knowledge of a violation or

122. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).
123. See id. § 51:714(A) (setting forth a remedy of “damages if [investor] no
longer owns the security”).
124. Id. (“Damages are the amount which equals the difference between the
fair value of the consideration the buyer gave for the security and the fair value
of the security at the time the buyer disposed of it, plus interest thereon from the
date of payment to the date of repayment as computed in R.S. 51:714(C)(2).”).
125. Id. § 51:714(C)(1). See also Williams v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 556
So. 2d 914, 916 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that there is a two year prescriptive
period for a Louisiana Securities Law claim).
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notice of facts which, in the exercise of due diligence, should lead to
actual knowledge.”126
Some affirmative defenses are available as well. Most defenses,
however, are not set forth in the Louisiana Securities Law itself but
are nonetheless available under Louisiana law generally.127 In fact,
the Louisiana Securities Law does not identify any affirmative
defenses except for one possible exception—that in the exercise of
reasonable care, the defendant–seller could not have known of the
untruth or omission.128 Although at least one court identified the
seller’s exercise of reasonable care as an affirmative defense, other
Louisiana courts have squarely held that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that the defendant–seller could not have known of
the untruth or omission.129 Thus, whether the reasonable care issue
is an affirmative defense at all, or is merely part of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, remains unsettled.
What appears reasonably clear, however, is that those persons
facing control-person liability may assert reasonable care as a
defense. Section 714(B) specifically says that control persons are
liable “unless the person whose liability arises under this Subsection
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the existence of the
facts by reason of which liability is alleged to exist.”130
Defendants to a Louisiana Securities Law claim also may draw
upon some affirmative defenses that are recognized under common
law and in federal securities law cases. The affirmative defenses of
in pari delicto, waiver, ratification, estoppel, laches, and failure to
mitigate damages have been recognized by some courts as available

126. Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So. 2d 942, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1998). See also
Kidd v. Symbion, Inc., No. 10–3361, 2011 WL 4020814, at *7–8 (E.D. La. Sept.
9, 2011); Delgado v. Ctr. on Children, Inc., No. 10–2753, 2012 WL 2878622, at
*7 (E.D. La. July 13, 2012); Jensen v. Snellings, 636 F. Supp. 1305, 1309 (E.D.
La. 1986) (“The limitations period is triggered by the discovery of facts which
would cause a reasonable man to inquire whether he has suffered a legal wrong.
The plaintiff need only possess a low level of awareness; he need not fully learn
of the alleged wrongdoing.”).
127. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure lists certain affirmative defenses
that must be set forth by the defendant with its answer. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 1005 (2015).
128. See Macareno v. Karon, No. 08–0292, 2010 WL 743564, at *4 (W.D.
La. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[W]hile plaintiff must plead all elements, ‘defendant must
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.’” (quoting
Landry v. Thibaut, 523 So. 2d 1370, 1380 (La. Ct. App. 1988))).
129. See discussion supra Part III.F.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:714(B) (2003).
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to those defending federal securities claims.131 No Louisiana court
has expressly recognized or rejected any of these defenses as being
available to those against whom a Louisiana Securities Law claim
has been asserted.
Nevertheless, some guidance to the question of whether these
defenses are available for Louisiana Securities Law claims can be
found in non-securities cases in which these affirmative defenses are
discussed generally. For example, Louisiana law plainly does not
recognize the common law defense of laches.132 However, the
concept of equitable estoppel has been recognized by Louisiana
courts,133 although it is not favored, and the defenses of waiver and
ratification have been recognized as well.134
Perhaps the most important affirmative defense available is
comparative fault pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2323(A).
Under Louisiana law, “[i]n any action for damages where a person
suffers injury, death, or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all
persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be
determined.”135 This code article, by its own terms, applies to “any
131. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 634–35 (1988) (noting that an in para
delicto defense is available under any federal securities law cause of action); Davis
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1213 (8th Cir.
1990) (recognizing defenses of estoppel, ratification, and waiver to Rule 10b–5
claim); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1980)
(analyzing whether defenses of estoppel, waiver, ratification, laches, and failure
to mitigate damages were established in the particular case); Goldman v. Bank
of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962)) (recognizing common
law defenses of waiver and estoppel apply to federal securities law claims).
132. Fishbein v. State ex rel. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 898 So. 2d
1260, 1270 (La. 2005) (“Because the doctrine of laches is in conflict with this
state’s civil laws of prescription, the statements contained in those civil opinions
that suggest the doctrine of laches may be applicable under certain
circumstances are hereby repudiated.”).
133. See Roberson v. Lafayette Oilman’s Sporting Clays Shoot, Inc., 845 So.
2d 1267, 1270 (La. 2003) (“Equitable estoppel or ‘estoppel in pais’ can be
defined as the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is barred from asserting
rights against another party justifiably relying on such conduct and who has
changed his position to his detriment as a result of such reliance.” (citation
omitted)). See also Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. 1995) (noting that
“estoppels are not favored in our law” and that “[e]quitable considerations and
estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail when in conflict with the positive written
law”); Harvey v. Richard, 7 So. 2d 674, 677 (La. 1942) (“The cases holding that
estoppels are not favored by our courts are legion in our jurisprudence.”); Waste
Mgmt. of La. v. Penn-America Ins. Co., 110 So. 3d 200, 203–04 (La. Ct. App.
2013).
134. Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Monroe Eng’g Ass’n, Inc., 430 So. 2d 696,
700–01 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (identifying affirmative defenses of waiver and
ratification); Favret v. Favret, 527 So. 2d 463, 467 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
135. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2015).
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action for damages,” which necessarily includes causes of action
under the Louisiana Securities Law.136 Accordingly, the comparative
fault defense allows defendants of Louisiana Securities Law claims to
reduce their percentage of fault by attributing fault to others involved
in causing the alleged loss, including the investor or any other
advisors.137 Moreover, because section 712(A)(2) is based upon
federal section 12(2),138 and because Louisiana courts look to
federal law for guidance on interpreting Louisiana’s Securities
Law,139 the defenses available to a section 12(2) claim should be
available to a section 712(A)(2) claim to the extent those defenses
are allowed under Louisiana law.
CONCLUSION
Even though the Louisiana Securities Law was enacted almost
100 years ago, the caselaw interpreting the Louisiana Securities Law
remains undeveloped compared to many other areas of Louisiana
law. The 2008–2009 financial crisis gave Louisiana courts some
opportunity to interpret provisions of the Louisiana Securities Law,
but most provisions still have seldom been interpreted, leaving
uncertainty on many important securities law questions. Some cases
whose treatment of issues have raised more questions than they have
answered, such as the question of reasonable care, add to this
uncertainty. Of course, no one can predict when many of these
questions will be presented to a Louisiana circuit court or the
Louisiana Supreme Court. Until such time, litigants invoking the
Louisiana Securities Law will be left to glean what they can from
the sparse Louisiana caselaw and then fill the gaps with reference to
the vast body of caselaw interpreting the analogous section 12(2)
claim under the Securities Act of 1933.

136. Id.
137. A notable exception to this rule is where a defendant conspires with
another defendant to commit an intentional tort. In this narrow circumstance,
comparative fault principles do not apply. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324(A) (2015). In
addition, it is possible under certain circumstances that an alleged violator of the
Louisiana Securities Law may have merely passive or derivative liability, and
the violator himself may have a delictual indemnification claim against a person
who caused his purported violation of the Louisiana Securities Law.
138. See supra note 33.
139. See supra note 5.

